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NOTES
seems to do a very workable job of compromise. Both seller and
purchaser have their rights well defined, and such concepts as the
inclusion of the auction sale in the field of bulk sales are clearly
well conceived.71 Certainly the former laxity on this point alone
provided an excellent potential means for an unscrupulous creditor
to escape his obligations. In summation it might be said that though
ideally North Dakota might do better, it could also do a great deal





NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - FICTITIOUS PAYEES - CHANGES
EFFECTED BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. - The common law
as developed in England' and subsequently restated in early
American cases,2 declared that an instrument which was payable
to the order of a designated payee should be given the effect of an
instrument payable to bearer, if the instrument had been made pay-
able to the order of a fictitious payee and such fact was known to
the party sought to be charged thereon.' This was later revised by
the British Bills of Exchange Act, 4 and the rule has subsequently
evolved to its present form in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law,' which states: "The instrument is payable to bearer when it
is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexistent person and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
A very anomalous situation occurs when courts are called upon
to treat an instrument payable to the order of a designated person
as if it were expressly payable to bearer. This is the fact however
when fictitious payees are considered. Although this situation has
not been adjudicated in North Dakota, it is by no means uncommon
in other jurisdictions and has been decided in both South Dakota"
and Minnesota7 both of which have laws similar to our own.8
71. U.C.C. § 6-108 and Comment.
1. Minet v. Gibson, 1 H.BI. 569, 100 Eng. Rep. 689 (1791).
2. See Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891).
3. Britton, Bills and Notes 691 (1943).
4. See Vagliano v. Bank of England, 22 Q.B. 103 (1888), aff'd, 23 Q.B. 243 (1889).
5. Negotiable Instruments Law § 9 (3); N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0209 (3) (1943).
6. See Janssen v. Tusha, 66 S.D. 604, 287 N.W. 501 (1939).
7. See Jorgensen Chevrolet Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Red Wing, 217 Minn. 413, 14
N.W.2d 618 (1944). •
8. S.D. Code § 46.0114 (3) (1939); Minn. Stat. J 335.052 (3) (1945).
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A typical case which might arise under §9 (3) would be: X,
an employee of A corporation, prepares a check payable to P, a
fictitious payee, and subsequently induces the treasurer of A to
sign the check. X then cashes. the check at B bank by indorsing
the name of the fictitious payee, while B credits the account of A
to the amount of the withdrawal. Under the present law A could
maintain an action against B for conversion of funds, since the in-
dorsement of X amounting to forgery would be ineffective and
would not transfer title.9 If, however, the treasurer of A or any
other of its officers authorized to sign checks had made the check
payable to a fictitious payee, it would have resulted in the instru-
ment being treated as bearer paper. Thus no indorsement would
have been necessary to transfer title and the corporation would
have suffered the loss.10
This "bearer paper" concept has also been applied to a situation
where two officers signed on behalf of a corporation, one of whom
knew of the fictitious payee.'1 Where an insurance agent submitted
false claims, thereby procuring the instruments payable to persons
who were in fact real but not intended by the drawer to have any
interest in the instruments, the drawee was held liable.'2 Where a
clerk padded a payroll with the names of fictitious payees the
drawee was likewise held liable."s One writer has said that indorse-
ments by a real payee to a fictitious payee would also be covered
by §9 (3).14
An interesting exception to the above rule was made in
National Bank of Commerce v. United States," where an instrument
was held not to be bearer paper since federal regulations pro-
hibited government clerks from issuing such instruments. Nor does
the "bearer paper" concept apply to misnomer or abbreviation. 6
Section 9 (3) of the NIL has now been amended in sixteen
states 7 to read: "An instrument is payable to bearer when it is pay-
able to the order of a fictitious or non-existent person, or living
9. United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E.
825 (1931).
10. Snyder v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atd. 876 (1908); Cf. Security-
First Nat. Bank v. Bank of America, 129 P.2d 424 (Cal. App. 1942), off'd, 137 P.2d
452 (1943).
11. See P.&G. Card and Paper Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 172 N.Y.S. 688 (1918).
12. National Surety Co. v. Halsted Street State Bank, 246 Ill. App. 92 (1927).
13. American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034
(1932).
14. Beutel, Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law 336 (7th ed. 1948).
15. 224 Fed. 679 (9th Cir. 1915).
16. Joseph Milling Co. v. First Bank, 109 Ore. 1, 216 Pac. 560 (1923).
17. Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia, Wyoming.
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person not intended to have any interest in it and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable or known to his employee
or other agent who supplies him with the name of such payee." The
effect and purpose of the amendment is to protect drawee banks
from losses which otherwist would be sustained as a result of the
fraud perpetrated by agents of the bank's depositors."8 It does
this by making the paper payable in effect to bearer when the
drawer does not intend that it should be payable to a fictitious
payee, but is fraudulently induced to make it so payable by an
employee or agent. Such being the case no indorsement is neces-
sary, title to the instrument passes with delivery, and therefore it is
not necessary to trace title through a forged indorsement. The
amendment has also extended the old provision to include situa-
tions where the fictitious payee is a real person but one not intended
to have any interest in the instrument.
Numerous attempts have been made by drawees and holders
to evade liability on the ground that the drawer was negligent in
allowing the checks or drafts to be issued. These attempts have
met with little success, however. It is generally held that the negli-
gence must relate to the forgery itself, not to the issuance of the
check.19 It is the duty of the bank to carry out the intent of its
depositors, regardless of the liability it incurs.10
In regard to the present law, it is thought that the words
"fictitious" or "non-existing" are unnecessary and to some extent
misleading.21 "Fictitiousness" or "non-existence" within the mean-
ing of the rule is determined by the intention of the drawer, which
must arise from his knowledge that the payee is in fact "fictitious."22
Under §9 (3) actual signers of checks can have no intent as to a
payee's identity where they sign in blank, merely complying with
another's request, or where the signer is a mere automaton. 23
Fictitious payees have been construed to include: the estate of one
who was yet alive,24 one who was alive but not intended to have
18. See Citizens Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co., 79 Ga. App. 184, 53 S.E.2d 179
(1949); Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat. B. & T. Co., 293 Ill. App. 423,
12 N.E.2d 714 (1938).
19. E.g., New York Cas. Co. v. Sazenski, 60 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1953).
20. Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891).
21. See Britton, Bills and Notes 697 (1943).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See Security-First Nat. Bank v. Bank of America, 129 P.2d 424 (Cal. App.
1942), af'd, 137 P.2d 452 (1943).
24. Janssen v. Tusha, 66 S.D. 604, 287 N.WI 501 (1939).
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any interest in the instrument, 2 a fictitious fir'm, 26 or a partnership
or firm which has changed its name.
27
It is thought that the present situation results oftentimes in
unfair treatment of the bank, that rather it should be the drawer
corporation which would always assume the loss involved, as a
risk of business. It is the corporation which is in a position to pre-
vent such occurences through care in selection and supervision of
employees or through protection which may be purchased in the
form of fidelity insurance. The bank on the other hand cannot often
be certain of the validity of a payee's signature. This however, is
not reason enough to hold the bank immune in the case where a
legitimate order instrument is stolen and a bank pays on a forged
indorsement. In such cases the loss properly falls on the bank. A
different rule than this would destroy much of the usefulness of
negotiable instruments as tools of trade, but fictitious payee and
imposter cases are another matter.2 Acknowledging that embezzle-
ment is an evil of commerce to be avoided, there is under the
present rule little incentive for the corporations to tighten their in-
ternal control as long as they know that it will be the drawee bank
which will bear the loss, when it is the corporation's employee or
agent which perpetrates the fraud.
Section 3-405 of the proposed UCC states: "(1) An indorse-
ment by any person in the name of the named payee is effective
if: a. an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced
the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his con-
federate in the name of the payee; b. a person signing as or on
behalf of a drawer intends the payee to have no interest in the
instrument; c. an agent or employee of the drawer has sup-
plied him with the name of the payee intending the latter to
have no such interest. (2) Nothing in this section shall effect
the criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing."
Sub-section 1 enlarges the original subsection 9 (3) to include
additional situations which it has not been held to cover. The
instrument is not made payable to bearer and indorsements are
still necessary to negotiation. It recognizes however, as effective
indorsement of the types of paper covered no matter by whom
made. This solution is thought preferable to making such instru-
ments bearer paper. On the face of things they are payable to order
25. Home Indemnity Co. v. State Bank of Ft. Dodge, 233 Ia. 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943).
26. Jorgensen Chevrolet Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Red Wing, 217 Minn. 413, 14
N.W.2d 618 (1944).
27. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 136 Va. 276, 118 S.E. 82 (1923).
28. See 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 281, 288 (1951).
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and should require what purports to be a regular chain of in-
dorsements.
29
Sub-section 1 (a) would reverse those decisions which dis-
tinguish between face-to-face imposture and imposture by mail, on
the theory that the loss, regardless of the type of fraud which the
particular imposter has committed, should fall upon the drawer. :!'
Sub-section 1 (b) restates the substance of the original-sub-
section 9 (3) but limits it to drafts with which most of the decis-
ions have been concerned. The following situations illustrate its
application: (a) The drawer of a check, for his own reasons,
makes it payable to P knowing that P does not exist. (b) The
drawer makes the check payable in the name of P. A person named
P exists, but the drawer does not know it. (c) The drawer makes
the check payable to P, an existing person whom he knows, intend-
ing to receive the money himself and that P shall have no interest
in the check. (d) The treasurer of a corporation draws its check
payable to P. P exists but the treasurer has fraudulently added his
name to the payroll intending that he shall not receive the check.
(e) The treasurer of a corporation draws its check payable to P,
who to the knowledge of the treasurer does not exist. (f) The
president and the treasurer of a corporation both sign its check
payable to P. P exists, the treasurer knows it but intends that P
shall have no interest in the check. In all of the foregoing ex-
amples an indorsement by any person in the name of P is effective."
Sub-section 1 (c) extends the rule of §9 (3) to include padded
payroll cases and fraudulent insurance claim cases. It applies only
to those situations where the agent or employee has supplied names
of payees intending that they should have no interest in the instru-
ment. This section may be applied in the following situations
(a) an employee of a corporation prepares a padded payroll for its
treasurer, which includes the name of P. P does not exist, and the
employee knows it, but the treasurer does not. The treasurer
draws the corporation's check payable to P. (b) The facts are the
same as in (a), except that P exists and the employee knows it but
intends him to have no interest in the check. In both cases an in-
dorsement by any person in the name of P is effective and the loss
falls on the corporation.8 2
Section (2) of UCC §3-405 is to be read with the section under
29. U.C.C. 3-405 (comment 1).
30. U.C.C. § 3-405 (comment 2).
$1. U.C.C. § 3-405 (comment 3).
32. U.C.C. § 3-405 (comment 4).
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which an unauthorized signer is personally liable on his signature
to any person who takes the instrument in good faith. As stated it
is not intended to effect criminal liability for forgery or any other
crime or civil liability to the drawer or to any other person.
3 3
With reference to the recent amendment to the Minnesota
NIL, it is stated in the annotation that the extension of the
bearer paper concept promotes expediting and safety in circulation
of negotiable instruments.14 The proposed changes of the UCC do
not further extend this theory but effect even more desirable results
by abrogating the theory completely. Section 3-405 does this by
requiring indorsement no matter by whom made.
Applying §3-405 to the hypothetical case presented earlier,
the result would seem to place the loss on the corporation on
whom it rightfully belongs. If adopted, this same section would
in all likelihood prevent much litigation, not benefiting the lawyer
directly but the community as a whole.3 Ezekiel would be happy
to see his prophecy come true, if only in this one small phase of the
law.36
FRANCIS BREIDENBACH.
TRIAL - INSTRUCTIoNS TO JURy - INSTRUcTIoNs BEFORE ARGU-
MENT. - Although the purpose of the instruction by the court to
the jury has been defined in a multitude of ways, it may be said,
in general, that its purpose is to inform the jury as to the law of
the case as it applies to the facts in such a manner that the jury is
not misled.' In order that this might best be accomplished the
practice was adopted at common law of giving the instructions after
the argument of counsel and immediately preceding the retiring of
the jury.2 The reasoning assigned as afixing this time for giving the
instructions was that after argument of counsel had pulled the jurors
hiteher and yon the judge had the final word to see that they retired
with a clear, unbiased and unemotional statement of the facts and
the applicable law fresh in their minds. A further reason was that
33. U.C.C. § 3-405 (comment 5).
34. See Minn. Stat. § 335.052 (3) (1945).
35. See 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 281, 289 (1951).
36. See Prophecy of Ezekiel c. 18, v. 20: "The soul that sins the same shall die. The
son shall not bear the sins of the father, the father shall not bear the sins of the son. The
justice of the just shall be upon him. The wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."
1. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson, 9 F.2d 7
(1925).
2. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 443 (1950).
